Eighth Circuit Reverses and Remands Meth User's § 922(g)(3) Conviction on Second Amendment Grounds
On Tuesday, July 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a methamphetamine user’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits an unlawful drug user from possessing a firearm. Citing developments in case law since the defendant’s conviction, the three-judge panel in United States v. Striplin remanded the case to the district court for renewed consideration of the defendant’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge. Judge Shepherd authored the opinion.
The decision comes from the same Circuit (and same writing judge) that, earlier this month, upheld a conviction under § 922(g)(3) for a marijuana user. The Supreme Court also considered that unlawful-user statute earlier this summer in United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. ____ (2026). There, the Court held unanimously that prosecuting Hemani under § 922(g)(3) violated his Second Amendment rights, in part because the government failed to show that his regular marijuana use rendered him dangerous. Readers can find the Center’s more detailed discussion of Hemani here and here.
Background
The case arises from an April 2020 high-speed vehicle chase between Benjamin Striplin, the defendant, and Missouri police officers. After police arrested Striplin at the end of the chase, they searched his vehicle and found a .22 caliber pistol and a modified soda bottle that Striplin later admitted he used to smoke methamphetamine. In a subsequent interview with police, Striplin admitted that he was a regular methamphetamine user, had been using methamphetamine for the previous ten years, and had last used the drug within three to four days of his arrest. He also admitted he had owned the pistol since at least the day before the chase.
A grand jury indicted Striplin on one count of knowingly possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance, in violation of §§ 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2). Striplin then moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(3) violated his Second Amendment rights both on its face and as applied to him, and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied.
Proceedings Below
In July 2023, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Striplin’s motion to dismiss. For Striplin’s Second Amendment challenge, the district court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495 (8th Cir. 2023). Bruen declared that the Second Amendment presumptively protects an individual’s right to bear arms in self-defense absent a historical tradition of analogous firearms regulation. Jackson (2023) addressed a conviction under § 922(g)(1)—the felon-in-possession statute—as opposed to § 922(g)(3), the unlawful user conviction at issue here. Nonetheless, the district court read Jackson (2023) as recognizing “the relevant historical tradition of firearms regulation in the United States as including prohibiting ‘categories of persons [from possessing firearms] based on a conclusion that the category as a whole presented an unacceptable risk of danger if armed.’” On that reasoning, the district court held that it did not need to reference the specific facts of Striplin’s case to determine whether the statute’s application to him was constitutional. Because Striplin’s conviction was consistent with historical tradition under Jackson (2023), both his facial and as applied challenge failed. The district court did not address Striplin’s vagueness argument.
After the district court denied Striplin’s motion to dismiss, the parties proceeded to a bench trial, agreeing to a stipulated set of facts. In that bench trial, the court found Striplin guilty of violating § 922(g)(3).
Before the Eighth Circuit
On appeal, Striplin argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because § 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him and is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
The Eighth Circuit determined that Striplin failed to show § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Circuit precedent, the court explained, requires the absence of a temporal nexus between gun possession and regular drug use to sustain an as-applied vagueness challenge to § 922(g)(3). In contrast, Striplin admitted that he was an active methamphetamine user when he possessed his gun.
The panel evaluated Striplin’s as-applied Second Amendment argument using the two-step framework from Bruen. At step one, it was undisputed that Striplin’s conduct—possessing a firearm—fell within the plain text of the Second Amendment.
At step two, which requires the government to show that § 922(g)(3) is consistent with historical tradition of regulation, the panel acknowledged that “the district court rendered its decision at a time when there was little guidance from this Court or the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(3).” Since that time, the Eighth Circuit has rejected the principle that courts should treat §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(g)(3) the same in as-applied challenges.
Additionally, the court explained, both the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit have since made clear that courts must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry when considering as-applied § 922(g)(3) challenges at Bruen step two. Judge Shepherd noted that, in Hemani, the Supreme Court “rejected the notion that the Government may ‘automatically strip [a defendant] of his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm because he uses marijuana a few times a week.’” The Eighth Circuit itself has held that § 922(g)(3) is consistent with the Second Amendment when applied to a defendant (1) whose substance use caused him or her to behave like someone who is mentally ill or dangerous or (2) whose substance use causes the defendant to “induce terror, or pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others with a firearm.”
Because the district court issued its decision before Hemani mandated a fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry, the panel remanded the case for further factual development, particularly as to the dangerousness question. Based on the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Baxter just a month ago, upholding a 922(g)(3) conviction for a habitual marijuana user, it seems unlikely that a meth user’s conviction would be overturned even after the development of a factual record.
Takeaway
The scope of United States v. Striplin is likely narrow, reflecting the fact-specific nature of § 922(g)(3) as-applied challenges in the wake of Hemani, rather than a broader doctrinal shift. Indeed, as noted above, the same judge who authored this opinion joined a panel upholding a § 922(g)(3) conviction for a marijuana user earlier this month, based on evidence that the defendant’s marijuana use rendered him dangerous. Even so, United States v. Striplin illustrates how quickly the legal landscape surrounding § 922(g)(3) has evolved in just three years.