The Gun Bog: Iowa Supreme Court Finds Some Solid Ground in the Supremacy Clause

This guest post does not necessarily represent the views of the Duke Center for Firearms Law.

In 2022, Iowa amended its Constitution to require “strict scrutiny” for reviewing gun regulations. The amendment was heavily influenced by advocacy from the National Rifle Association. As a former Iowa state trial judge for 37 years, I initially believed the amendment would not hinder much gun control legislation. I told my wife, a priest and lobbyist with the Episcopal Church who opposed the amendment, that any competent judge could find a compelling state interest in addressing the public health crisis caused by permissive firearm regulations.

Then came the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. These rulings, building on the Court’s earlier decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, abandoned traditional levels of judicial scrutiny in favor of a test involving history and tradition.  Under this approach, modern gun laws must have a historical analogue to pass constitutional muster.

With these federal rulings in mind, Iowa courts faced a new challenge: How should they handle cases where both federal and state gun laws are challenged under the Second Amendment and Iowa’s newly amended Article I, Section 1A? As Professor Eric Ruben noted in this earlier post:

[l]itigants seeking to take advantage of strict scrutiny in challenges to regimes that combine federal and state prohibitions—which are common in gun law cases—will be disappointed as judges become bogged down in the first-order question of whether state constitutional law is implicated at all.

In State v. Kieffer (decided February 21, 2025), the Iowa Supreme Court avoided the bog in answering the first-order questions of whether and how Article I, Section 1A of the Iowa Constitution applies.  Instead, it relied on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to conclude that the Iowa Constitution had no bearing on federal firearm prohibitions.

Ezekiel Kieffer was convicted of domestic abuse assault after he hit and choked his girlfriend, leaving scratches on her neck and face, marks on her back and legs, broken blood vessels in her eye, and a bloody lip. The trial judge extended a previously entered no-contact order for five years as part of Kieffer’s sentencing. Additionally, the court issued a notice under Iowa Code section 724.31A, informing Kieffer that his firearm rights were revoked due to his domestic violence conviction. The notice referenced Iowa Code section 724.26(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), both of which prohibit individuals convicted of domestic violence offenses from possessing firearms.

Kieffer appealed, arguing that the firearm prohibition violated both his Second Amendment rights and his rights under Article I, Section 1A of the Iowa Constitution.

Relying on Bruen and Rahimi, the Court dismissed Kieffer’s Second Amendment claim, stating: “Kieffer has identified no cases upholding a Second Amendment challenge to a firearm prohibition premised on section 922(g)(9), and we are aware of none.” The Court further noted that whether considered under Rahimi’s test of “pos[ing] a clear threat of physical violence to another” or the individualized “dangerousness” standard applied by some circuits, the Court had “little trouble concluding that the firearm prohibition in Kieffer’s no-contact order does not offend the Second Amendment under the current landscape of federal jurisprudence.”

Next, the Court examined whether the firearm prohibition violated Article I, Section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. The Court concluded it did not, emphasizing that the only firearm restriction before the court was the federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Because Kieffer had not applied for a permit to carry and had not been charged with illegally possessing a firearm under Iowa law, challenges to the state statutes that restrict domestic violence offenders from having and carrying guns were not ripe.

The Court invoked the Supremacy Clause, stating: “The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes clear that the Iowa Constitution has nothing to say about a firearm prohibition imposed by federal law.” In other words, the Court concluded that the Supremacy Clause precluded it from considering whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) complied with Article 1, Section 1A of Iowa’s Constitution. The Court issued a clear, bright-line ruling: When a firearm prohibition is based on a federal statute, Iowa’s constitutional strict scrutiny standard does not apply.

But this is just the beginning of the development of post-1A firearms jurisprudence in Iowa. As Iowa trial courts slowly navigate the complexities of federal and state constitutional challenges to firearms regulations, several critical questions remain unanswered. For example, what about the situation where an Iowan is barred from possessing firearms under an Iowa statute that depends for its operation on a federal statute? For example, Iowa Code § 724.26(2)(a) provides that a person under a protective order entered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is ineligible to possess firearms. Jordan Cole consented to the entry of a domestic abuse decree. Applying the federal statute, the trial court in the decree prohibited Cole from possessing firearms for the duration of the order. While the order was in effect, Cole sold a gun and pawned two others. He was charged with and convicted of violating Iowa Code § 724.26(2)(a).

State v. Cole is pending before the Iowa Supreme Court. In their briefs, the parties have framed two issues: First, does the state firearms prohibition violate the Second Amendment? Second, does the state firearms prohibition violate Article I, Section IA of the Iowa Constitution? Regarding the first question, the parties employed a Bruen analysis. Regarding the second question, the parties employed a strict scrutiny analysis. The significance, if any, of the state statute being inextricably related to the federal statute was not argued in the parties’ briefs.

And, what about the situation where one is prosecuted under the state statute prohibiting carrying a firearm while in possession of marijuana? Kevin Woods was found in possession of marijuana and a gun in violation of Iowa Code §724.8B. He was convicted and has appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court. Like the Cole case, the parties request that the Court evaluate Mr. Woods’ state constitutional challenge separately from his federal constitutional challenge. Like the Cole case, the court would have to apply a strict scrutiny analysis to the state claim and a Bruen analysis to the federal claim. Unlike the Cole case, the Iowa statute subjecting Woods to criminal liability for possessing a weapon and marijuana does not involve or depend upon a federal statute. Woods is also pending before the Iowa Supreme Court and fully briefed.

What is the correct analysis when a firearms regulation is challenged only on state constitutional grounds? On September 13, 2024, in Plymouth County, Iowa, a trial judge granted a motion to dismiss in a prosecution for a violation of Iowa Code § 724.26(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. The case is State v. Dickson. Mr. Dickson contended that Iowa Code § 724.26(1) was unconstitutional under Article I, Section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. He did not make a Second Amendment challenge.

In determining that the firearms prohibition violated the Iowa Constitution, the trial court employed a two-step analysis, applying both the Bruen and strict scrutiny tests. Concluding Article I, Section 1A of the Iowa Constitution was intended to provide an additional layer of protection, he said:

. . . in order for a firearms regulation to survive an article 1, Section 1A challenge, the State must prove both that the challenged regulation is ‘part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms’---which would be sufficient to survive a Second Amendment challenge---and that the regulation if narrowly tailored to the achievement of a compelling state interest.

The State did not appeal the ruling.

These cases collectively illustrate the challenges trial judges have in applying federal and state constitutional rights to firearms regulations. Needing guidance, trial judges in Iowa hope that the forthcoming appellate decisions in Cole and Woods will clarify the extent to which state firearms laws can validly impose firearms restrictions, particularly when they are intertwined with federal statutes.